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LAW STUDENTS' UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW SCHOOL ACADEMIC
SUPPORT PROGRAMS (ASPs)
Mark Graham* and Bryan Adamson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Law school academic support programs (ASPs) help students improve their
skills in the study, analysis, and communication of their understanding of the
law. Law students involved in first-year academic support courses spend much
time, effort, and energy learning techniques such as case briefing, statutory
analysis, course outlining, time and stress management, issue spotting, and exam
preparation and performance.' By stressing these topics, academic support in-
struction aims to impart skills necessary not only for first-year examination
performance, but for academic success throughout law school. Moreover, teach-
ing the fundamentals of legal reasoning lies at the heart of academic support
instruction
Of course, effective first-year performance and academic success through-
out law school is largely dependent upon a student mastering the process of legal
reasoning. While there are numerous definitions of legal reasoning (and much
debate regarding these definitions), there are at least three fundamental reasoning
skills that first-year students should be employing as they develop lawyering
skills: inductive reasoning, deductive reasoning and analogical reasoning.' These
reasoning types (among other, more advanced concepts) are used in every facet
of the first-year law school student's academic experience - for study, writing,
classroom discussion, and examinations.
One longstanding assumption in both the legal academy and the legal pro-
fession is that three years of study develops or refines a student's capacity to rea-
Ph.D. Candidate in Educational Psychology, Columbia University. Special thanks to James
Corter, David Krantz, Shannon Salinas, Kevin Nisbett, Rahul Dodhia, J.B. Reynolds, and Maggie
Donegan of Columbia University; Leslie Garfield of Pace University; Paula Lustbader of Seattle
University School of Law; and Kevin Hopkins of John Marshall School of Law. The research
presented in this report was the pilot work for a subsequent research grant awarded by the Law
School Admissions Council (#99-18) to J. Corter and M. Graham of Columbia University.
Nevertheless, this work is independent and not affiliated with the Law School Admission Council
!n any way.
Director, Academic Enrichment Program, Associate Professor of Law, Assistant Dean for Stu-
dent Services, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank Leslie
Garfield and Paula Lustbader for their advice and counsel. I also thank my colleagues Lewis Katz
and William Leatherberry for their suggestions.
' In addition, many academic support programs address the Socratic Method, comparing and con-
trasting judge-made law and statutory or quasi-statutory law, collaborative learning, learning styles,
or use of public policy.
See generally KARL LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH (4th ed. 1973).
3 RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING (1989).
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son within a legal framework.4 It is also assumed that a student body consisting
of "capable" individuals (e.g., a high score on the Law School Admission Test
(LSAT) and undergraduate grade point average (UGPA) being the primary
measuring tools of capacity), should be intellectually equipped to understand and
apply the tenets of legal reasoning.! However, both assumptions neglect the fact
that these individuals enter law school with a variety of educational backgrounds.
As a result, three equally "capable" individuals with different undergraduate
backgrounds - in, say, engineering, philosophy and nursing - all take the same
Contracts, Torts, and Civil Procedure courses.6 Each of these individuals, re-
gardless the level of success obtained in their respective fields, may bring to the
classroom different levels of competency in legal reasoning.
Experience as a law school faculty member has shown that some students
grasp the mechanics of legal reasoning early on. Other students begin to see the
"big picture" while preparing for their first-semester examinations. Still others,
though to a lesser degree, appear not to understand the framework of legal rea-
soning until much later in law school. Regrettably, there are always the unfortu-
nate few who just never seem to "get it."
This article addresses whether or not law students' comparative educational
backgrounds affect their ability to solve general deductive reasoning problems.
This question leads to two broader issues: (1) whether any comparative differ-
ences in general reasoning competency affect a student's ability to reason within
a legal framework; and (2) whether a student's reasoning competency remains
static over three years of law school. This article addresses the first issue. At
present, a separate study7 is being conducted to explore how general reasoning
differences may influence a student's ability to reason within a legal framework.
Whether law students' educational backgrounds significantly impact legal
reasoning skills is a question based on two relevant research studies within the
cognitive psychology literature on reasoning and academic background, one at
' In 1921 the American Bar Association adopted the recommendation of its Committee on Legal
Education, that a law student's course of study be three years. James P. White, Legal Education in
an Era of Change: Law School Autonomy, 1987 DUKE L.J. 292, 294-95. Now, all ABA-accredited
law school graduates must have completed six semesters of study. ABA Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 304(b)(1999).
Combined LSAT and UGPA measures have been widely and consistently used as the primary
determinants in law school admission. ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
and the National Conference of Bar Examiners, Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Require-
ments (1999), Margaret Fuller Corneille and Erica Moeser, eds. at 17. Taken together, LSAT and
UGPA scores are perceived to be the best predictors of law school success. Richard 0. Lempert et
al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 395, 459 (2000) (surveying research results). That perception is not without its crit-
ics. Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Important Thing, 21
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 993 (1999); Gregory Williams, Transforming the Powerless to the
Powerful: The Public Responsibilities of Law Schools, 28 N.M. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998). This article,
however, does not address the issue as to whether the LSAT and UGPA are valid tools for measur-
ing knowledge, or reliable predictors of law school academic success.
6 See Lempert et al., supra note 5, at 395.
' M. Graham & J. Corter, Dissertation Research (2001) (research on file with co-author Mark
Graham).
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the graduate level involving law students,8 and one at the undergraduate level.9
Considered together, these studies suggest that undergraduate training in the
natural sciences or the humanities (as opposed to the social sciences) encourages
the development of deductive reasoning and problem solving skills,' ° both of
which are integral to learning in legal reasoning." In other words, undergraduate
disciplines require and reinforce, to different degrees, specific reasoning types
which may be beneficial to learning legal reasoning. However, no research to
date has specifically addressed the connection between a law student's under-
graduate study and its effect on legal reasoning.
This article contends that law school academic support programs could use
undergraduate degree information 2 to assess differences in reasoning ability to a
greater extent than they currently do. Proficient use of the data currently under
examination could yield several advantages to academic support professionals:
1. ASPs could better identify, at the outset, those students who may
best benefit from academic support programs;
2. ASPs would be afforded an additional tool with which to diag-
nose a student's academic support needs; and
3. ASPs could assist in the development of more efficient training
for students enrolled in first-year academic support programs.
A brief description of deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning is the
first step in analyzing the relationship between general reasoning ability and law
school performance. A study. of the application of these principles of logic to the
legal tasks of case briefing, case synthesis and use of analogy will follow. Initial
research examining law students and deductive reasoning will be shown to sug-
gest that undergraduate study does have an impact on a law student's ability to
learn legal reasoning skills. The article will conclude with a recommendation




Deductive reasoning is a cognitive process whereby particular conclusions
are reached through the application of general rules. 3 The most familiar type of
' Darrin R. Lehman et al., The Effects of Graduate Training on Reasoning: Formal Discipline and
Thinking About Everyday Life Events, AM. PSYCH. 113,434-43 (1988).
9 Darrin R. Lehman & Richard E. Nisbett, A Longitudinal Study of the Effects of Undergraduate
Education on Reasoning, DEV. PSYCH. 26, 952-60 (1990).
'0 d.
"RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING (3d ed. 1997).
12 For purposes of this research, it must be said that undergraduate study is only a proxy for a whole
host of characteristics of a student or learner. For example, it is reasonable to assume that a stu-
dent's choice of undergraduate major reflects her learning goals, motivation and previous experi-
ence (including high school education). Concededly, there are inherent shortcomings in classifying
undergraduate majors. Further research on this issue is currently under way.
'3 ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 49.
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deductive reasoning is the syllogism.14 A strict or categorical syllogism is com-
posed of three propositions and three terms" (a major term, minor term, and mid-
dle term), whereby each term is found in only two of the three propositions.'
6
The first, more general proposition is the "major premise" (sometimes referred to
as the categorical premise). 7 The second, more specific proposition is the "minor
premise" (sometimes called the conditional premise).' 8 The third is the conclu-
sion. 9 To posit a valid deductive argument, the conclusion must entail the two
premises: "if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true." 20
Another form of deductive logic relates to "If-Then" conditional logic
221
statements. 2 Formally known as modus ponens (Latin for "affirming the form")22
and modus tollens (Latin for "denying the form"),23 this logic essentially proves a
statement to be true by employing the contra-positive. 4 Like syllogisms, If-Then
arguments are also comprised of three propositions - in this case, a conditional
premise, a categorical premise, and a conclusion.5 The conditional premise has
two components: an antecedent (the "If' statement), and a consequent (the
"Then" statement).
26
In making a valid modus ponens argument, the categorical premise affirms
the antecedent of the conditional premise, and the conclusion affirms the conse-
27quent of the conditional premise. To make a valid modus tollens argument, the
categorical premise must deny the consequent of the conditional premise, and the
conclusion must deny the antecedent.
28
B. Inductive Reasoning
Inductive reasoning is the cognitive process whereby observations lead the
student to a general proposition. 29 The strength and certainty of the induction isdependent upon the number of relevant observations supporting or denying the
4 Id. at 46
'5 A "term" is a word or phrase in a proposition.
16 ALDISERT, supra note 1 at 45-46. This is perhaps the most familiar type of deductive logic.
Aldisert offers up the classic example of syllogistic reasoning: "All men (middle term) are mortal
(major term). (major premise). Socrates (minor term) is a man (middle term). (minor premise).
Therefore, Socrates is mortal (conclusion)." Id. at 46.
17 Id.
I d. at 45-46.
I9d. at 45.
20 Id. at 49; ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS: SYMBOLIC
LOGIC FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 5 (1997).





26 ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 159.
27 A modus ponens argument, symbolically, can be illustrated as follows: "If A, then B. A, there-
fore, B." Id.
" ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 159-60. A valid modus tollens argument would look like this: "If A,
then B. Not B, therefore, not A." Id. at 160.
29 Id. at 93.
[Vol. 69:533
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proposition." This type of induction is commonly referred to as "induction by
enumeration."3' It should be noted that an inductive conclusion is not true, per
se. Rather, the conclusion is "a proposition that is more probably true than not."
32
C. Analogical Reasoning
Perhaps best viewed as mediating, or as lying somewhere between induc-
tive and deductive reasoning, is analogical reasoning. Analogy can be generally
described as reasoning "from the particular to the particular., 3   Reasoning by
analogy has the following steps: (1) a beginning premise, i.e., relevant facts and a
conclusion; (2) a description of factual respects of similarity and difference be-
tween the referenced premise and the presenting problem; and (3) a judgment as
to whether it is the similarities or the differences that are more important (ren-
dering the analogy more or less plausible). 4
Reasoning by analogy is both inductive and deductive. Reasoning by anal-
ogy is inductive because it is a process which looks in part at particular charac-
teristics of a scenario. In addition, analogical reasoning is similar to inductive
reasoning because its purpose is not so much to prove a conclusion, but rather to
show its degree of strength." However, unlike inductive conclusions, the strength
of the analogical conclusion depends not upon the number of similarities, but
upon the significance of relevant similarities, as in deductive reasoning.36 Rea-
soning by analogy is, thus, both deductive - because of its inherent degree of
empirical soundness and its structural form - and inductive - because of its re-
luctance to assert truth.3
7
Deductive, inductive and analogical reasoning are just three logic types,
which allow persons to contemplate, process, understand, and communicate in-
formation. To be sure, these logic types play pivotal roles in the learning of law.
Having set forth three primary reasoning types, the discussion now turns to ex-
amine how these types exist in the context of legal reasoning.
'0 James R. Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. REV. 833, 847 (1982).
ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 90.
Id. at 103. Induction entails (1) making a number of observations, and (2) arriving at a general
proposition based on those observations. For example: Chair A has four legs; so do chairs B, C, D
... and Z. Therefore, all chairs have four legs. Note that the conclusion is not absolutely true;
indeed there are things we call chairs which, for example, have three legs. That fact, however, does
not undercut the strength of the induction. Its strength lies merely in its probability.
" Id. at93.
'4 STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 26 (2d ed. 1995).
:5 ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 51.
36 Murray, supra note 30, at 853 ("The effectiveness of the analogy is based on the relevance of the
similarities, not the quantity of similarities" and the "significance of the relevant similarity") (em-
phasis added); ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 96-7; BURTON, supra note 34, at 25-44. Conversely, a
conclusion negating the analogy turns upon the absence of relevant similarities.
" RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 20, at 335. A useful schematic: Case A, which states principle X,
has characteristics of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5; characteristics 1, 2, 3, and 5 are relevant to principle X; Case
B has the characteristics 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6; Case A and Case B share characteristics 1, 2, 3, and 5;
characteristics 4 and 6 are irrelevant to principle X; therefore, it is most probable, principle X
applies to Case B.
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III. REASONING AND THE CONNECTION TO LAW SCHOOL
SKILLS
A. Generally
Without question, the use of deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning
is used every day, in most every aspect, of a law student's academic life. For
example, when creating a general rule from a series of cases, students reason
inductively. When students read judicial opinions to determine whether facts set
forth warrant the application of a particular legal principle, they employ deduc-
tive reasoning skills. And, when students are asked to compare a new set of facts
to a former case (whether through a professor's hypothetical, writing a legal
brief, or on an examination), they draw analogies through induction and deduc-
tion.
In his article "Skills Training in 'Legal Analysis': A Systematic Ap-
proach,38 Paul Wangerin addresses ways of teaching dialectical skills in sub-
stantive law school courses.39 In laying the groundwork for his discussion,
Wangerin first explores the meaning behind what is commonly considered the
core goal of legal education: teaching students to "think [ ] like a lawyer."4 After
surveying other scholars' definitions, Wangerin goes on to distill these (if only
slightly) varied interpretations of how "thinking like a lawyer" translates into
"the use of facts, statutes, synthesis, analogies, policy, and apparent contradic-
tion." 4,
Though Wangerin's discussion is primarily concerned with how these im-
portant skills are mastered, his categories provide a useful framework with which
to illustrate the roles that deductive, inductive, and analogical reasoning play in
law school learning, and legal reasoning generally. This paper focuses on two of
the six skills Wangerin sets forth: synthesis and analogy. Before discussing these
two skills, however, we first address the case method of instruction in order to
lay a foundation for the discussion of synthesis and analogy.
B. Case Briefing and Reasoning Skills
In traditional law school courses, students are taught through the case
method. Through analysis of judicial opinions, students learn the fundamental
method by which legal rules are established.42 The case method also teaches stu-
dents the reasoning processes that are employed when establishing these rules.
To be sure, it is this latter outcome which makes the case method so valuable. In
38 Paul T. Wangerin, Skills Training in "Legal Analysis": A Systematic Approach, 40 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 409 (1986).
39 Dialectical skills in legal education refer to the ability "to read and analyze cases and []to
construct legal arguments." Id. at 412. Case briefing, synthesis, and use of analogy are three
dialectical skills addressed by Wangerin, which this article will discuss and apply. See infra,
Section III.
40Id. at 415.
41 Id. at 430-31.
42 Of course, legal rules exist in other sources, e.g., constitutions, statutes, restatements, or learned
treatises.
[Vol. 69:533
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reading judicial opinions, students are constantly challenged to exercise and de-
velop reasoning skills.
When a student briefs a case, both inductive and deductive reasoning skills
are engaged. Each court decision has a rule of law as its source that attaches a
"definite, detailed legal consequence to a definite, detailed state of facts."'4 In the
common law system of rule making, general propositions are developed through
inductive generalization. The legal principle established through inductive gen-
eralization then serves as the categorical premise to analyze the subsequent case.
Moreover, the case itself may be reduced to a deductive argument. The case of
Girouard v. State,"4 addressing the issue of criminal provocation, illustrates this
point.
In Girouard v. State, Steven Girouard was convicted of second degree
murder for stabbing his wife, Joyce, during a heated argument at their home.45
The couple, who had been married for only two months at the time, were both
army enlistees." In the course of the argument, Joyce stated several times that
she had never loved Steven, that their marriage was a mistake, and that she
wanted a divorce.4 ' At one point, Steven went into their bedroom, where he lay
down." Joyce followed him into the bedroom and climbed upon the bed and
onto his back.49 Then, while pulling his hair, she reiterated her earlier insults, and
made disparaging remarks regarding his sexual ability.0 Joyce also stated that
she had filed charges against Steven for abuse which would result in his court-
martial.5 Steven left the bedroom for the kitchen, retrieved a knife, and re-
turned.52 After more argument, Steven stabbed Joyce nineteen times.53
On appeal, Girouard contended that his wife's provocation should have
mitigated his crime from murder to manslaughter. The Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's murder conviction, affirming the rule that words alone are inade-
quate provocation to reduce a conviction of murder to manslaughter.5
When applying inductive reasoning to the Girouard case, it is necessary to
assume that a student has a general understanding of the underlying question, i.e.,
what, legally, qualifies as sufficient provocation 6 In reading Girouard, a stu-
4 ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 8 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in
Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REv. 475, 482 (1933)).
583 A.2d 718 (1991). Girouard and subsequent cases discussed herein are taken from the
casebook, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (6th ed., SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER eds., 1995)




41583 A.2d at 719.
:0 Girouard v. State, 583 A2d 718, 719 (1991).





56 Several sources inform this understanding. Even if a student knows nothing about the Girouard
case itself, she sees that it falls within Kadish and Schulhofers' discussion of "a. The Nature of
Provocation. (I) Traditional Common Law Limits." KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 44, at 411.
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dent would consider that Joyce and Steven were husband and wife. The student
might also note that Joyce stated: (1) she wanted a divorce, (2) she had never
loved Steven, (3) Steven was sexually inadequate, and (4) she had filed abuse
charges against him for which he would be court-martialed. The student would
also observe that, at one point, Joyce initiated physical contact with Steven, and
that some time shortly thereafter Steven stabbed Joyce nineteen times.
From these specific observations, the student might reason by induction
(i.e., arrive at a general proposition based on particular observations57) that, in
cases such as Girouard, words alone are insufficient to provoke killing. How-
ever, the student's conclusion does not follow absolutely. The court in Girouard
still could have found that Joyce's statements were indeed adequate to justify a
successful assertion of provocation as an affirmative defense, particularly in a
case where there was also physical contact. Regardless of the conclusion, it is
most important to recognize that any conclusion yielded through inductive rea-
soning is only more or less probable.
Articulating a legal rule out of Girouard first requires reducing the opinion
to its most essential elements. The legal rule discussed and applied in Girouard
can be expressed in deductive form. Creating a deductive argument based on the
syllogism, the student might state the following from the facts and holding of
Girouard:
Words uttered (middle term) by a victim, without more, are in-
sufficient provocation (major term). [legal rule / major premise]
Steven killed Joyce (minor term) because of words ut-
tered(middle term). [fact / minor premise]
Steven, in killing Joyce (minor term), cannot successfully assert
provocation (major term) as an affirmative defense. [holding /
conclusion]
In creating a deductive argument based on conditional logic, a modus po-
nens argument might go something like this:
" If Steven killed someone merely because of words uttered (antece-
dent), then Steven cannot successfully assert provocation as an
affirmative defense (consequent).
* Steven killed Joyce merely because of words uttered.
" Therefore, Steven cannot successfully assert provocation as an af-
firmative defense.
A modus tollens form of the argument would read like this:
If Steven can successfully assert provocation as an affirmative
defense (antecedent), then Steven did not kill Joyce merely be-
cause of words uttered (consequent).
In addition, more likely than not, the student knows what "provocation" means. So, from these
cues, the student goes into a reading of Girouard with some type of framework which informs her
understanding.
.' ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 93.
[Vol. 69:533
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* Steven killed Joyce merely because of mere uttered.
* Therefore, Steven cannot successfully assert provocation as an
affirmative defense.
Each of these schemes is deductively valid. In each argument, the categori-
cal and conditional premises are true. Moreover, in each form, the conclusion
follows logically from the premises.
From the above examples, it can be seen that both inductive and deductive
reasoning play a role in briefing cases. Through these processes, it is also clear
that distilling a judicial opinion to its most "essential" components enhances stu-
dents' understanding.
C. Legal Synthesis and Reasoning Skills
Legal synthesis refers to the process of bringing together several legal
authorities to create a single proposition." The ability to create and use legal
synthesis is a skill that academic support programs typically seek to help their
students improve upon,'9 since it is a skill essential to effective legal writing, and
one that is commonly tested on law school examinations.
One type of legal synthesis involves fashioning legal propositions from a
series of cases.60 Instruction by the case method, to be sure, demands a capacity
for legal synthesis. Properly employed, the case method enables a student to
bring together legal principles established in a body of law. In practice, however,
instruction in the case method may give the impression that legal rules estab-
lished in judicial opinions stand independently, without need for reference to the
case before or the case after. Of course, holdings arising out of judicial opinions
do not stand alone. The law is dynamic, and each legal rule arising out of a case
is a component of a larger, ever-evolving principle.
As Karl Llewelyn noted, when a student reads a case, she should be asking
herself "what does this case add to what I already know? '6' Remarkably, many
students experience great difficulty effectively placing cases in their larger con-
texts (synthesizing cases). 62 The value of mastering the skill of synthesis, how-
ever, cannot be overstated.
Through review and analysis of judicial opinions, legal principles are de-
veloped.63 Depending on particular facts, a subsequent case may have the effect
of illuminating, modifying, expanding, or contradicting a principle. A subse-
quent case may leave the initial case wholly undisturbed, declare it invalid or
inapplicable, or create an exception. 64 Placing a series of cases into a larger con-
58 Wangerin, supra note 38, at 442-43.
" See, e.g., Academic support programs at the University of Denver, The John Marshall Law
School, Case Western Reserve University and the University of San Francisco, which instruct in
case synthesis or, alternatively, topic or course outlining.
60 Wangerin, supra note 38, at 442-43.
6' KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 54 (Oceana Publica-
tions, 3d ed. 1960).
62See discussion, infra, at 25.
61 Paul T. Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 ALB. L. REV. 471,518-19 (1988).6"Id.
2001]
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text can also illuminate the progression or evolution of a legal principle. Re-
gardless of what a subsequent case "does" to a legal principle, the ability to bring
together a series of related cases under a single idea or proposition is critical to
understanding the law.65
Case synthesis involves inductive, deductive, and analogical reasoning.6
Case synthesis begins with the inductive process of developing a legal rule aris-
ing out of several authorities.67 In the process, the student simultaneously identi-
fies the facts relevant to (or, those which induce) the rule. This rule provides the
foundation (or the major premise) for which to review a subsequent case and
distill the case to its deductive essence. From an analysis of four, five, or ten
cases, the legal rules are fashioned to develop a "big picture" of the legal princi-
ple at issue. Analogical reasoning takes place by comparing, contrasting, and
weighing particulars of the cases.
Revisiting Girouard provides a useful demonstration of case synthesis. To
do so, however, it is also necessary briefly to examine three companion cases to
Girouard.
In State v. Shane,68 the issue was whether a voluntary manslaughter instruc-
tion to the jury was required where evidence was presented that the defendant
killed his fianc6e, with whom he lived, when she admitted her infidelity.69 The
court affirmed the rule espoused in Girouard that the victim's words alone did
not justify the defendant's act.7 In so doing, the court stated that no exception to
this general rule would be created even under circumstances where the parties
were in a close relationship. However, the court expanded on this rule by stat-
ing that, as an initial matter, a judge must determine whether the evidence at trial
would reasonably support an instruction to the jury as to the lesser-degree offense
of voluntary manslaughter.72
The second case, Maher v. People,73 represented a departure from the ap-
proach taken by the courts in Girouard and Shane. The court in Maher allowed
for the possibility of the affirmative defense of provocation in circumstances
where the victim was a third party, and where no precipitating physical contact
between the victim and the defendant had occurred. In Maher, the defendant
shot his victim one half hour after witnessing him engaged in a sexual act with
his wife, and after being told by a witness that he had seen the victim and defen-
dant's wife similarly engaged the day before. The trial judge rejected the evi-





590 N.E.2d 272 (1992).
6MId. at 274.
70 Id. at 278.
7I id.
72 id.
71 10 Mich. 212 (1862).
74 1d. at 216-17.
71 Id. at 217.
[Vol. 69:533
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The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. Unlike the Shane court, the court
in Maher ruled that there could be circumstances - not involving physical assault
upon a person - which could cause that person to act "in heat of blood."'6 Yet the
court also stated that a determination must be made as to whether there was suffi-
cient "cooling time" between the act precipitating the passion and the act taken as
a result. 77 The court held that while the trial judge should, as a matter of law,
determine what is reasonable or adequate provocation (whether words or acts),
the question as to whether reasonable or adequate provocation was proven should
be a question of fact for the jury .
An act while under duress was considered in People v. Casassa,9 the third
companion case. The Casassa court was called upon to interpret a New York
Penal Code provision in the context of a defendant convicted of murdering a
young woman with whom, after dating casually, he had become obsessed. The
code provision allowed an affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance
for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,"' which the trial court
rejected. Interpreting this provision as intended to expand the range of circum-
stances under which a provocation defense would be allowed, the court of ap-
peals nonetheless affirmed the trial court's ruling." In so holding, the appellate
court ruled that both the presence of extreme emotional disturbance and the rea-
sonableness of that disturbance were questions of fact. However, the court found
the former to call for a subjective inquiry, while the latter was to be determined
under an objective standard. 2
From the holdings of these particular cases - Girouard, Shane, Maher, and
Casassa - a general principle can be derived (i.e., synthesized). Typically, under
common law, mere words uttered by a victim will not permit a defendant suc-
cessfully to assert an affirmative defense of provocation. This is so even when
the victim and defendant are in a close relationship. The law will recognize some
acts committed in the heat of passion, but requires an evaluation as to whether
sufficient "cooling time" existed to diminish motivation for the act. Furthermore,
whether particular words, or in some cases acts, would give rise to reasonable
provocation is a question of law for the judge to determine, with the determina-
tion as to whether sufficient provocation was proven is a question for the trier of
fact. With the codification of what constitutes sufficient provocation, courts will
now consider evidence which goes to a defendant's subjective state of mind re-
garding the existence and degree of emotional duress. However, a trier of fact
will still make a determination as to whether the defendant's state of mind was
objectively "reasonable."
From this example, we see how effective case synthesis involves more than
just "stringing together" case holdings. Effective case synthesis entails deriving
an overarching legal principle from a series of particular cases through induction.
761d. at 219.
7' Id. at 223.
7 I1d. at 221-22.
7949 N.Y. 2d 668,404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).
"'Id. at 1314.
" Id. at 1317.
82 Id.
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Simultaneously, deductive reasoning is important in articulating the rule, relevant
facts, and holding of each case. Finally, in considering the factual relationships
between the cases to create a broad legal principle, reasoning by analogy is es-
sential.
D. Analogy and Reasoning Skills
83The use of analogy is one of the most critical legal skills to master. It in-
volves the examination of past case precedent and its application to a subsequent
case or a new set of factual circumstances. '4 Unlike synthesis, the skill of legal
analogy concentrates on the facts of a single past case, instead of the ideas,
propositions or rules emerging from a group of past cases. Moreover, unlike
synthesis, the skill of legal analogy focuses on the similarities and/or differences
in the facts to determine whether a particular holding applies to the case at hand
and to what degree. In drawing a conclusion as to whether a legal rule should
apply in the new circumstance, the quality, not the quantity, of similarities is the
important consideration.
In legal reasoning by analogy, the starting point is the holding or broad
principle from a past case. After identifying the principle arising out of the
precedent, facts of the presenting case are examined and compared to the facts
and circumstances which gave rise to the precedent. After factual similarities
and differences are noted, a determination must be made as to the significance of
the similarities and differences. Significance, in turn, is determined by evaluat-
ing whether facts are relevant or irrelevant, disputed or undisputed, or are prov-
able or unprovable. Only then can an argument by analogy be said to be -more or
less plausible. 86
Reasoning by analogy is both inductive and deductive. As in induction,
particular observations are made to reach a general conclusion.87 In addition, like
inductive reasoning, a conclusion reached by analogy does not necessarily fol-
low, but is characterized as being weak or strong. Nevertheless, because rea-
soning by analogy entails both the identification and the weighing of relevant
similarities and differences, analogical conclusions carry empirical credibility.
So, while the analogical conclusion does not follow absolutely from its premises,
it is, due to its empirical nature, akin to deductive logic.
Recalling the general rule of provocation from Girouard, viz., that words
uttered by a victim, without more, are insufficient grounds on which to assert a
successful affirmative defense, the concept of reasoning by analogy can be illus-
trated. In an attempt to draw a plausible conclusion as to the relationship be-
tween Girouard and Shane, reasoning by analogy is useful. There are several
83 ALDISERT, Supra note 11, at 95.
84 Id. at 12; BURTON, supra note 34, at 25-31; Wangerin, supra note 63, at 520. This is so because
common law jurisprudence operates on the principle of stare decisis. The tenet to treat like-cases
alike entails drawing analogies between past case precedent and presenting circumstances. See
RODES & POSPESEL, supra note 20 at 333; BURTON, supra note 34, at 25-26.
85 Wangerin, supra note 63, at 448-55.
86 Murray, supra note 30, at 844.
87 However, in analogical reasoning, what is induced is not a general proposition, but a particular
one. ALDISERT, supra note 1, at 90-9 1.
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factual differences between the cases. In Girouard, the parties were married; in
Shane, the parties were not." In Girouard, the couple had no children; in Shane,
the parties had a child.89 In Girouard, there was physical contact by the victim
upon the defendant; in Shane, there was no such contact. 90 In Girouard, there
was no admission of sexual infidelity by the victim, but a protracted argument; in
Shane, there was such an admission, but apparently nothing more.9' In Girouard,
the defendant stabbed his wife nineteen times; in Shane, the defendant strangled
his fiancee.92
To determine whether a plausible analogy can be drawn between Girouard
and Shane, one must assess which facts were significant to the outcome of each
case and whether the factual differences between them are significant. The
words uttered by the victim were of a deeply personal, hurtful nature. In both, a
close relationship existed (as inferred from the facts of marriage and/or cohabita-
tion and the words uttered). In Girouard, some facts weighed (inductively) in
favor of a conclusion that sufficient provocation existed (e.g., the physical con-
tact). However, given the court's ruling, the following is clear: the fact that (1)
Steven and Joyce were married; (2) Joyce had physically assaulted Steven; (3)
Steven stabbed Joyce nineteen times; and (4) Joyce and Steven had engaged in a
protracted argument just prior to Steven killing her - had no impact on the out-
come of the case. That no such evidence was present in Shane compels the con-
clusion that Shane is plausibly analogous to Girouard in all relevant, significant
respects.
IV. WHERE LAW STUDENTS FAIL TO REASON WELL
Despite deductive, inductive and analogical reasoning skills being an inte-
gral part of the law school learning process, professors see many examples of
students who fail to properly demonstrate these skills. Whether responding to a
hypothetical, drafting a legal brief or memorandum, outlining topics or respond-
ing to an examination question which requires an analysis of new facts in light of
cases studied, students often commit reasoning errors.
A. Reasoning Gaps
There are often "gaps" in reasoning where students fail to include steps
crucial to making their arguments. For example, in evaluating a student's re-
sponse to an examination question, one or more of the following errors may oc-
cur: (1) the student fails to state the controlling rule, but does state how the rule
applies, and articulates a conclusion;93 (2) the student states the controlling rule,
Girouard, 583 A.2d 718, 719; Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 273.
'9 See Girouard; Shane, 590 N.E.2d at 273.
'0 Girouard, 583 A.2d at 719; Shane, 590 N.E.2d at 273-74.
9'Girouard, 583 A.2d at 719; Shane, 590 N.E.2d at 273-74.
" Girouard, 583 A.2d at 720; Shane, 590 N.E.2d at 273.
9' Typically, if the controlling rule is omitted, we are told by the student that he "assumed" the
professor knows the applicable rule, and thus, the rule does not bear repeating. While not a wholly
invalid assumption, it often happens that a student fails to articulate the controlling rule, it is mis-
applied - rendering the argument not only incomplete, but wrong.
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and the conclusion, but fails to apply the rule, or; (3) the student states the con-
trolling rule and applies it, but fails to articulate a conclusion.9" Where these and
other reasoning gaps exist, professors make evaluative judgments regarding the
soundness, or completeness, of the student's argument.
B. Conclusiveness
Similarly, professors often encounter student responses that are prematurely
"conclusive." Not only does the student fail to state the rule of law which is in
issue, he will often fail to apply the facts which compel the conclusion. For ex-
ample, a student may state "X is guilty of murder," or "the elements of causation
are not met," without sufficiently demonstrating how she reached the conclusion.
Once again, the argument comes across as incomplete or less-thoroughly rea-
soned.
C. Too Many, Too Few, or the Wrong Facts.
In briefing cases, students may make the error of including too many, or too
few facts, which provide the basis for a court's holding. Professors see this most
often in the beginning months of a student's law school career, at which time she
may still be unfamiliar with (and/or uncomfortable in making) the inferences
needed to distill judicial opinions into their essential components. As a result,
students will "overbrief" cases. Similarly, especially on examination questions
which require students to "spot" issues, professors encounter instances in which
students are unable to identify facts relevant to a legal ruling, or those which best
compel (or mitigate against) the application of a particular rule.
D. Not Painting the Big Picture
In attempting to synthesize cases, students are often unable to create an ac-
curate "big picture" of a body of legal authority. Concededly, this process is
made more difficult because each case may present exceptions, caveats and
modifications to the legal principle being examined. Nonethess, what professors
often see is a mere serial discussion of the cases with no sense of their relation-
ship to one another. Moreover, students often miss or ignore the "twists, turns, or
bumps" that individual cases create in a body of authority. Such errors demon-
strate a failure to communicate an accurate and coherent articulation of legal
authority.
Deductive, inductive and analogical reasoning play a critical role in all of
the tasks mentioned above formally or informally. These mistakes in students'
efforts at briefing cases, written advocacy, creating course outlines, or taking
examinations are, arguably, flaws in reasoning. The degree to which the reason-
ing skills students bring to law school account for these flaws is a question worth
exploring, but one for which there is little existing literature. For example, no
study has addressed the issue of how students learn to reason within a legal
framework. However, the focus of this paper is on what general reasoning skills
"Such argumentation, called an enthymeme, is very common. ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 61.
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law students from varying backgrounds possess and bring with them to their law
school environment.
V. ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE AND GENERAL REASONING
ABILITY
The present research study focuses on law students' ability to solve rea-
soning tasks that involve general deductive logic structures. 9 Specifically, the
research design addresses the question of whether law students coming from
certain undergraduate majors perform significantly better on common, everyday
scenarios that involve a consistent and specific deductive reasoning structure.
In the psychology literature, two studies investigating separate populations
(graduate96 and undergraduate" students) have found that students' particular
field of study has an impact on performance gains. Depending on the student's
field of study, some individuals are competent at solving inductive reasoning
problems while others are adept at answering deductive reasoning problems.
Specifically, one study found that the ability to solve inductive reasoning prob-
lems or deductive reasoning problems significantly differs among law students,
medical students, psychology graduate students, and chemistry graduate stu-
dents.98 Another study found that the ability to solve these same problems differs
significantly for undergraduate students in the natural sciences, humanities, and
social sciences. 99 Below, the results for each study are reviewed. Then, implica-
tions for the present research design's goal of testing whether there are reasoning
ability differences among law students based on their undergraduate discipline
are discussed.
For this review, the important point is that undergraduate training in rea-
soning 0"° and graduate school training in reasoning'0 ' show that different kinds of
training bring about different levels of improvement in deductive reasoning abil-
ity. '°2 For example, at the undergraduate level it was demonstrated that natural
science and humanities students exhibited very large gains in conditional rea-
soning (deductive logic statements) during their undergraduate training, '03 yet
little (if any) skill gains in methodological and statistical reasoning (regression to
the mean, law of large numbers). '°' Lehman and Nisbett concluded that there was
a causal connection between the type of major studied in undergraduate educa-
tion and the level of gains in deductive reasoning ability.'0 5 Furthermore, at the
graduate level, Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett also showed that students in some
9' RuLEs FOR REASONING (Richard E. Nisbett ed., 1993).
See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
9' See Lehman et al., supra note 8.
" See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
99 See Lehman, et al., supra note 8.
'00 See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
'0' See Lehman et al., supra note 8.
'0' Patricia W. Cheng et al., Pragmatic versus Syntactic Approaches to Training Deductive Reason-
ing, 18 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 293 (1986).
0'3 See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.'04 See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
'0' See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
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areas of training (such as psychology, law, and medicine) exhibited moderate to
large gains in conditional reasoning, while others (such as chemistry) did not.' 6
In sum, research studies mentioned above show that both undergraduate
and graduate education can change the way people reason. In particular, the re-
search suggests that while some fields of undergraduate training significantly
improve the ability to employ deductive reasoning, other undergraduate training
appears to leave this ability largely unchanged. Of particular interest is the find-
ing that deductive reasoning is also improved by the training associated with law
school.07
While deductive reasoning is not legal reasoning, it is a sub-skill.'8 What
is of strategic importance to law school admission offices, professors, and aca-
demic support directors is the realization that the improvements in deductive
reasoning in law school may be dependent upon a student's undergraduate train-
ing. While this is an intuitively appealing notion and one that is implicitly sup-
ported in the research literature, it is a hypothesis that has never been directly
tested. In short, the undergraduate reasoning and graduate reasoning studies pre-
sent strong findings. However, neither study makes the connection between
training in one domain and the ability to develop one's reasoning skills further in
a new setting. In pursuit of this overall question, the following section reports on
one experiment that is part of a larger set of investigations currently underway.'0 9
VI. THE METHODOLOGY: EVALUATING LAW STUDENTS'
REASONING SKILLS AND THEIR UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR
It is worthwhile to look more closely at the reasoning skills of law students,
given that the results of Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett are so striking." Both
natural science and humanities undergraduate students had a disproportionate
amount of deductive reasoning gains as opposed to social science and psychol-
ogy undergraduate majors (given that there were no initial differences among
groups)."' Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett found significant results for graduate
training in conditional reasoning (law, medicine, and psychology)."2 Neverthe-
less, the research design did not consider prior exposure to deductive training.
The current research considers whether currently enrolled law students from
natural sciences and humanities backgrounds perform better on general deductive
reasoning problems that do law students from social sciences backgrounds."3
Participants. Currently enrolled law students from two U.S. law schools in
the United States participated in this study (School 1 and School 2). Participants
either volunteered to complete the materials in a classroom setting at the end of a
'o' See Lehman et al., supra note 8.
107 Id.
'0o ALDISERT, supra note 11, at 48-49.
'09 Graham and Corter Dissertation work, Columbia Univ. (2001).
"o See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
' See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9.
112 id.
,3 In a forthcoming research study, Graham and Corter include deductive reasoning problems that
are more law-based in context (2001) (research on file with the authors).
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lecture (School 1, 53 students), or were recruited (and were paid four dollars) at a
table set up in a public space (School 2, 49 students). In both cases, there was a
generally quiet and non-distracting environment.
Participants included first-year law students (50 students), second-year law
students (35 students), and third-year law students (17 students). All participants
completed the experiment's materials"'4 towards the end of the spring semester,
ensuring that first-year students had finished at least one semester of law school.
From the original 140 law student participants, categories were developed
based law students' undergraduate majors. Majors that had six or more individu-
als per group were compiled. From this information, a reduced group of 102
participants data was compiled to comprise the final data set. The final group-
ings of the undergraduate majors of currently enrolled law students included the
following: economics (12 students), English/literature (16 students), history (14
students), math/engineering (9 students), philosophy (6 students), and political
science (45 students).
Most participants ranged between 23 and 28 years of age, and there were 53
females and 49 males. Participating law students came from a diverse range of
undergraduate institutions. Regarding their undergraduate majors, some indi-
viduals reported a "double major" (25 students) and others reported a "minor"
(32 students). Furthermore, of the students reporting a "double major" there were
also a few students reporting a "minor" (7 students)."
5
Procedure. All participants experienced the experiment in the following
way. They first signed a consent form that explained the purpose of the research.
Next, they were shown a practice problem to become familiar with the format for
the majority of problems they will encounter. This practice problem did not
contain the deductive logic structure being tested in this experiment, though it
was similar in surface appearance.
After completing the sample problem, a set of instructions was presented
and read by each participant. Participants were then given the experimental ma-
terials, which consisted of six general deductive reasoning problems similar to
those that appeared in Experiment 1 of Cheng and colleagues.
' 6
Participants also completed a demographics questionnaire. This question-
naire asked for the three key variables: (1) undergraduate major, (2) year in law
school, and (3) Law School Aptitude Test (LSAT) scores. Based on previous
research showing a relationship between deductive reasoning skill and mathe-
matics expertise," 7 the number of undergraduate mathematics courses taken was
also requested. Other information included in the questionnaire consisted of the
11 Cheng et al., supra note 97, at 301. See also Appendix, infra, for a specific example.
I' For the coding of undergraduate major, there is no systematic attempt made to deal with the
problems associated with "double majors" and "minors," other than to choose the first major that a
student writes down. For example, a student could be a double major in Political Science and
History. Which one should be coded as their undergraduate major? While subsequent studies such
as M. Graham and J. Corter's deal with this issue more thoroughly, it goes beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
.. Cheng et. al., supra note 97, at 301.
"7 S.L. Jackson & R.A. Griggs, Education and the Selection Task, 26 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC Soc.,
327-30 (1988).
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following: first-year law school courses taken, first-year law course grades, the
extent to which students "liked" their first year courses, law review membership,
and intended area of concentration while in law school. All information men-
tioned above was self-reported by the participants.
Materials. The main section of the experimental materials consisted of six
general deductive reasoning problems. All problems were generated from the
existing deductive reasoning literature.' 8 Of the six problems, two were of a
"Permission/Obligation" structure, two were structured as "Converse Bias," and
the remaining two were "Arbitrary." Based on the results of previous research,
the "Permission/Obligation" problems are the most "pragmatic" or "everyday,"
while the "Arbitrary" problems are the most abstract. "9
Before running the experiment on a large scale, a small group of ten law
students were interviewed after completing the materials to assess how they per-
ceived the task. While some of the students reported noticing a particular pattern
across problems, others did not. Since most students treated each problem indi-
vidually and carefully, the experiment was then conducted on a larger scale.
Design. The design was a between-subjects correlation study exploring the
relationship between two independent variables (undergraduate major and year in
law school) and one primary dependent measure (Total General Deductive Rea-
soning Score).
VII. THE RESULTS: DOES UNDERGRADUATE TRAINING IN
REASONING MATTER IN LAW SCHOOL?
All statistical analyses conducted used Analysis of Covariance (AN-
COVA).' 2° The total model testing deductive reasoning performance with under-
graduate major as the dependent variable plus LSAT scores and school as covari-
ates was significant. 2' Previous analyses indicated that there were no deductive
reasoning performance differences indicated by year in law school (first-, sec-
ond-, or third-year), yet these results must be taken with caution since there were
disproportionately more first- year students in the sample of law students (see
previous section). But there were also no significant deductive reasoning per-
formance differences when the combined groups of second- and third-year stu-
dents (52 students) were compared with first-year students (50 students). In ad-
dition, there were no significant differences in deductive reasoning performance
by gender or age.
As described in the methods section, thirty-eight participants had to be
dropped from the analysis due to insufficient undergraduate major category size
within the original sample. In addition, two combinations of majors were made
in this analysis. In one category - math/engineering - there were not enough
mathematics majors (only 2 students) or applied math majors (only 3 students) or
.. Cheng et al., supra note 97, at 301; Lehman et al, supra note 9, at 442; Lehman & Nisbett, supra
note 6 at 960.
19 See Cheng et al., supra note 97, at 174-85.
120 Readers unfamiliar with statistical analysis may find it more beneficial to read only the first
sentence of each paragraph and the Table.
12' F (7,94) = 23.933; p <.000; R-squared = .641.
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engineering majors (only 4 students) to group separately. But based on the re-
search of Jackson and Griggs' 2 it seemed reasonable enough to group these ma-
jors together (as indicated by the high number of mathematics courses each indi-
vidual had taken). Due to the similarity of undergraduate coursework taken, it
was also assumed that English majors and literature majors were enough alike to
be combined in a similar fashion. Thus, the final six undergraduate major cate-
gories were the following: math/engineering, philosophy, economics, Eng-
lish/literature, history, and political science.
There were marginally significant performance differences in deductive
reasoning between School A and School B.'23 But since the statistical power of
the school covariate was low, it is likely that the variables of school and LSAT
overlap. 24 Thus, deductive reasoning performance differences based on school
are dropped in favor of individual differences based on LSAT scores. As ex-
pected, deductive reasoning performance differences based on the covariate
LSAT scores were significant."' For the independent variable, undergraduate
major, there were significant deductive reasoningperformance differences based
on the six majors included in this study.26
Since the independent, undergraduate major variable is statistically signifi-
cant, group differences between Math/Engineering, Philosophy, Economics,
English/Literature, History, and Political Science can be examined. The reported
means are adjusted group means based on the LSAT score distribution. In other
words, the analyses first account for individual differences in LSAT scores
among the 102 participants that are grouped by undergraduate major. Then, the
academic major group averages are adjusted statistically. All analyses are based
on this initial adjustment for LSAT score.1
27
Table 1 shows the average deductive reasoning performance score by
group, as well as its 95% confidence interval distribution (that is, the long lines).
Here, average scores are actually estimated group means. That is, for every
analysis conducted, LSAT was entered first and consistently appeared as a sig-
nificant covariate.
"2 See Jackson & Griggs, supra note 108, at 327-330.
123 F (1,94) = 3.561; p = .062.
24 Participants' average LSAT scores: School A = 168.91 (SD = 4.85); School B = 157.83 (SD =
5.48). All LSAT scores were self-reported by the participants.
F (1,94) = 14.200; p < .000.
26 (5,94) = 13.395; p < .000.
127 Adjusted means are based on the covariate LSAT scores = 163.16.
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Table 1
All Problems (6) by Academic Discipline with LSAT
6
2





Math/Engn. Philosophy Economics EnglJlit. Pol. Sci. History
9 6 12 16 45 14
Academic Discipline
Out of a total possible score of six deductive reasoning problems, the LSAT
score adjusted means were the following: math/engineering = 4.52; philosophy =
4.02; economics = 3.26; English/literature = 2.46; history = 1.28; political sci-
ence = 1.73 .128 Math/engineering majors' deductive reasoning performance was
significantly different from that of majors in economics, English/literature, his-
tory, and political science majors.'29  Philosophy majors' deductive reasoning
performance was significantly different from English/literature, history, and po-
litical science majors (although the philosophy group performance should be
viewed with caution since there were only six students in total). 130 English/ lit-
erature majors' deductive reasoning performance was significantly different from
history and political science majors.''
"' 95% confidence intervals for each group are the following: math/engineering = (3.73, 5.32);
philosophy = (3.03, 5.01); economics = (2.56, 3.97); English/literature = (1.86, 3.06); history =
(.643, 1.92); political science = (1.37, 2.09).
"9 For math/engineering and economics: mean difference = 1.257; p = .020; 95% confidence
interval = (.202, 2.313). For math/engineering and English/literature: mean difference = 2.064; p
<.000; 95% confidence interval = (1.07, 3.06). For math/engineering and history: mean difference
= 3.240; p <.000; 95% confidence interval = (2.219, 4.2620). For math/engineering and political
science: mean difference = 2.80; p < .000; 95% confidence interval = (1.91, 3.67).
,0 For philosophy and English/literature: mean difference = 1.563; p = .008; 95% confidence
interval = (.410, 2.72). For philosophy and history: mean difference = 2.74; p < .000; 95%
confidence interval = (1.55, 3.93). For philosophy and political science: mean difference = 2.30; p
< .000; 95% confidence interval = (1.22, 3.37).
31 For English/literature and history: mean difference = 1.18; p = .009; 95% confidence interval =
(.301,2.05). For English/literature and political science: mean difference = .729; p = .042; 95%
confidence interval = (.028, 1.43).
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VIII. DISCUSSION: INTERPRETATION OF LAW STUDENTS'
PERFORMANCE
The results of this research study first indicate that, as expected, LSAT
scores are most indicative of performance on general deductive reasoning prob-
lems. Yet, once differences in LSAT scores are accounted for (thus, representing
- albeit roughly - students' general ability), there are still performance differ-
ences in deductive reasoning that are related to the undergraduate major of cur-
rently enrolled law students. Thus, these findings are in line with the research
literature mentioned previously, suggesting a transfer of training effect based on
an individual's academic discipline. While most likely due to differences in the
sampling of IL, 2L and 3L groups, year in law school was not an important fac-
tor in students' ability to solve general deductive reasoning problems.
The undergraduate major of law students is related to their performance on
general deductive reasoning problems, even after their LSAT scores are consid-
ered. Law students with mathematics, engineering, and philosophy majors had,
to a statistically significant extent, more correct answers than economics, Eng-
lish/literature, history, and political science majors on these general deductive
reasoning tasks. Law students with an economics or English/literature major
had, to a statistically significant extent, more correct answers than those who had
been history or political science majors during their undergraduate careers. The
results are generally compatible with past research on this topic.' Thus, initial
results suggest that deductive reasoning skills of law students from certain un-
dergraduate disciplines such as natural sciences or humanities may be systemati-
cally higher as compared to those from other disciplines such as the social sci-
ences.
The reported findings make sense from the standpoint of the existing psy-
chology literature on deductive reasoning. In its abstract form, deductive rea-
soning is a formal logic that most individuals do not intuit without specific expe-
rience and training. When constructed in more familiar scenarios, however, de-
ductive reasoning is an intuitive form of the formal logic that "maps on to" or
"overlays" the formal one. In other words, individuals can solve the deductive
reasoning problems without knowing the formal logic structure so long as they
can somehow map their intuitive, everyday logic on to the more formal one built
in to the given deductive reasoning problem.
In the experiment, some problems presented to the law students were per-
haps most easily solved by means of intuitive, everyday logic that "overlapped"
the formal deductive logic structure of the problem. Nevertheless, other prob-
lems were more abstract and did not lend themselves to be solved by this intui-
tive process. It was here that significant differences were found in relationship of
deductive reasoning ability to law students' undergraduate academic discipline.
More formally, the present study replicates prior research in that despite each
deductive reasoning problem having the same underlying logic structure, more
individuals were able to solve the pragmatic, everyday problems; fewer individu-
32 Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9, at 958 (concurring, except for the economics majors in this
sample population, likely due to their math training).
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als were able to respond correctly as the nature of the problem became more ab-
stract."' As previous research has shown, this study also found that individuals'
undergraduate discipline had an effect on deductive reasoning ability.'" The
results confirm the previously cited research showing that background academic
discipline training does matter and that it differs by field of study. Thus the pres-
ent study contributes to longstanding inquiries regarding transfer of training. '35
Law students' performance varied on deductive reasoning problems, even
when controlled for LSAT scores. That is, even when ability differences were
accounted for statistically, the undergraduate training of law students was signifi-
cant. A source of this variation had to do with students' field of study prior to
entering law school. Thus, a transfer of training effect in deductive reasoning
was found for law students based on their previous academic discipline.
There are significant limitations to the present research findings, however.
For example, do reasoning differences by undergraduate discipline persist
throughout three years of law school? Alternatively, is it more the case that as
individuals progress through three years of law school they become more and
more familiar with deductive reasoning? In the present study, students' year in
law school was not significantly related to their performance on the deductive
reasoning problems. However, previous research 3 6 shows a significant gain in
deductive reasoning over three years of law school. At present, the sample size
of third-year students in this study is likely too small to show performance differ-
ences; thus, future research with a larger population of third-year students is re-
quired before any conclusions can be drawn."'
From the perspective of legal education and law school instruction, the re-
sults of this research may confirm some suspicions. That is, even after differ-
ences in LSAT scores have been taken into account, law students vary in their
ability to comprehend logic structures that are, at minimum, related to legal rea-
soning. Specifically, legal reasoning requires the skill of deductive reasoning to
arrive at logically complete arguments. This research shows that individuals in
law school, as previous research has shown with individuals in general,'38 vary in
their ability to work with formal reasoning structures. These differences are ac-
counted for by (a) the nature of their training prior to law school, and (b) the ex-
tent to which they can transfer this training into the law school learning environ-
ment - a setting which is novel.
IX. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ACADEMIC
SUPPORT PROGRAM LAW STUDENT IN 2010
There are ways of productively applying the general trends reported in this
research to the law school learning environment. For academic support programs
in law schools, the results of this research may help in developing strategies to
' See Cheng et al., supra note 97.
'3 See Lehman & Nisbett, supra note 9, at 959.
... See Cheng et al., supra note 97, at 314.
3' See Lehman et al., supra note 8, at 438.
'3' See Graham & Corter, dissertation research (2001).
'3 See Cheng et al., supra note 97, at 314.
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assess students and promote more focused instruction. Specifically, ASP admin-
istrators should note two trends. First, LSAT test scores largely accounted for
group differences in deductive reasoning in the present data set, as is to be ex-
pected. Second, there were also significant differences based on the students'
undergraduate discipline (i.e., their major) and academic training prior to law
school. Most notably, these results were not limited to law students with high
math ability; rather, humanities students (English and literature majors, specifi-
cally) showed strong deductive reasoning skill performance as well.
From this viewpoint, individual differences in learning reasoning skills as-
sociated with legal reasoning go beyond law school students LSAT scores and
undergraduate grade point average. It may not be a matter of ability as defined
by those predictors (reliable as they are). Instead, observed differences in legal
reasoning within an ASP context may also be due to law students' training in
their undergraduate academic discipline. For example, a history major may or
may not reason deductively to the same extent as an engineer although both may
be seeking assistance of an academic support program.3 9 In general, the differ-
ences found in the study may begin to explain a variety of gaps in legal reason-
ing, as identified by law faculty and other evaluators of law student learning.
In interpreting this research as members of the law school community in-
volved with educating students, however, it is essential for academic support
programs to devise an appropriate framework for evaluating law students' ability
to employ various reasoning skills and structures. More specifically, it is inap-
propriate to oversimplify current law students' cognitive abilities by their major
prior to law school, and such practice should be avoided entirely. Rather, these
preliminary findings suggest that undergraduate major should be employed as
one of several indicators, along with LSAT score, GPA, and comments from
legal writing instructors, to assess student needs.14
X. WHAT CAN ASPs DO TO BETTER ACCOUNT FOR ABILITY
AND NEED?
The present study reports that learning certain elements of legal reasoning
may not involve the same process for all students in a law class or in an academic
support program. When training in legal reasoning is provided within an ASP
context, an understanding that the road to learning legal reasoning may not be the
same for all students is an insight into how to design effective instruction.
One approach to better account for ability and need is to employ a multi-
faceted approach to gathering information about a student or group of students,
including LSAT scores, undergraduate grade point average, undergraduate major,
and a writing assessment from their legal writing instructor. Within this context,
,' As a reminder, only average group difference - not individual differences - were tested in this
pilot study.
Furthermore, results reported in this research are "average" differences by group: some catego-
ries that had "low" averages performed well. For example, some History majors had perfect scores.
It is also important to know that some disciplines were not accounted for in this study due to a low
number of participants (biology majors, nurses and archeologists). Thus, generalizing to other
disciplines beyond what was reported is not advised.
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it is also appropriate to administer evaluative questions testing various legal rea-
soning frameworks such as deductive reasoning. When the various points of data
are taken together, a more informed decision about what level of instruction is
appropriate can then be made.
For some students who exhibit general deductive reasoning ability, appro-
priate training may consist of analogies to their prior field of study and a focused
reading of carefully selected cases. For example, an engineer who is now a first-
year law student with a 3.35 undergraduate grade point average, a 164 LSAT
score, and a writing instructor's assessment stating that "while a good student,
there are gaps in her arguments" may begin to understand deductive reasoning
within a legal reasoning context if the relationship to the "counter-factual" from
mathematics is emphasized, since engineers are well trained to consider problems
from this perspective. In such cases, perhaps this level of instruction is enough to
transfer the previous deductive training of the engineer to the new environment
of law school. For many individuals, a few well-chosen examples from case law
to accompany the counter-factual comparison may further solidify their under-
standing of legal reasoning within a deductive reasoning framework.
Nevertheless, other students may need to learn new skills their prior educa-
tional background has not provided. These students probably need more intensive
instruction and focused effort on their part. It is likely that they will need to pro-
gress from easy, everyday examples to progressively more difficult ones. It is
also likely that they will need to spend much more time and energy on the easier
cases until they are comfortable enough with the thinking structure to move on to
more dynamic cases that involve various other considerations.'
4'
In sum, there may be students in ASPs who need differentially focused le-
gal reasoning instruction. Specifically, the present research indicates that consid-
ering a law student's undergraduate major when making curriculum or instruc-
tion decisions may be one step in a more focused assessment of law students'
learning needs. Educators teaching in academic support programs are dedicated
to examining ways in which we can improve the success of our students. Help-
ing law students to be more effective in their study, analysis, and communication
of their understanding of the law compels us to grow our understanding of where
our students are "coming from." By considering our students' undergraduate
majors along with other factors, we may be better able to identify and reinforce
their legal skills and, in the process, develop methods to ensure their success in
the first year of law school and beyond.
' Due to the preliminary nature of these findings, any recipes for specific instructional strategies
for specific groups of students is beyond the scope of this research finding's discussion. A series of
research studies, with appropriate designs, is likely to yield a much stronger set of findings from
which we can begin to address such instructional approaches.
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